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Resume. La question du prochain agrandissement mediterraneen de I' Union 
Europeenne est reliee a un nombre de considerations, mais, en premieur lieu, aux 
priorites internationales changeantes de l'Union Europeenne elle-meme, a ses buts de 
politique etrangere et a la situation politique domestique dans les trois Etats ayant 
soumis leurs cdnl1idatures. En ce qui concerne Ie Chypre et Malte, et ceci jusqu 'en 
1996, les negociations auraient dCt commencer six mois apres la fin de la Conference 
Intergouvernementale, tandis qu 'une date sure n' avait guere ere etablie pour 
commencer les negociations avec la Turquie. Le changement du gouvernement d 
Malte, a la suite des elections d'octobre 1996, porta a la suspension de la candidature 
maltaise. En tre temps, la situation domestique en Turquie ne s'est pas modifiee selon 
les procedures qui auraient facilite ses pretentions d devenir membre de l'Union. En 
ce qui concerne Ie ((probleme Chypre", celui-ci continue a etre, a la fois et 
simultanement, la cause principale des contestations entre la Grece et la Turquie, un 
obstacle potentiel d la candidature du Chypre et un instrument de raccordement 
politique, utilise par Ankara, dans ses efforts pour accelerer la candidature turque. 
En decembre 1997, Ie Conseil Europeen a Luxembourg a confirme Ie debut des 
negociations avec Ie Chypre, declencheant ainsi I'irritation turque et marquant une 
nouvelle periode de turbulence dans les rapports entre I' Union europeenne et la 
Turquie. Celle-ci a declare avoir suspendu Ie dialogue politique avec I' Union et 
qU'elle n'assisterait pas d la Conference europeenne, convenue pour mars 1998. Ces 
developpements laissent prevoir que Ie futur agrandissement mediterraneenne 
comprendra que Ie Chypre. Cet article examine les politiques domestiques des trois 
pays candidats, ainsi que leurs politiques envers l'Union europeenne, dans Ie cadre 
des priorites internationales changeantes de l'Union, et examine egalement comment 
celles-ci modifient Ie prochain agrandissement mediterraneen. 
1. Introduction 
Until October 1996 it seemed undeniable that the two Mediterranean 
island States of Cyprus and Malta were ahead of the field of twelve 
aspirants in the EU membership race. Turkey was exerting all its 
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diplomatic efforts to keep up with them, though the widely held view was 
that her membership chances were negligible. Enlargement of the EU to 
include Cyprus and Malta posed no economic problems for the Union 
(however, neither did it promise many advantages). Both applicants, 
being micro-states, would be easy to absorb, especially since both had 
buoyant economies. However, their small size raised a number of 
institutional questions for the EU. Further, in the case of Cyprus, 
membership would necessitate the Union internalising the Cyprus 
Problem; in the case of Malta there was the question of how its neutrality 
would square with the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). Turkey raised diametrically opposing problems, i.e. its large size 
and relative economic backwardness coupled with its dismal human rights 
record and the cultural differences. In its dealings with the ED, Turkey's 
trump cards were two: it was a pivotal member of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) and it held one of the keys to a solution to 
the Cyprus Problem. Turkey's NATO membership was devalued as a 
diplomatic bargaining chip following the end of the Cold War, while its 
ability to use the Cyprus Problem to its advantage was seriously damaged 
when, in 1995, the EU decided to start negotiations with Cyprus six 
months after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference, with or 
without a solution to the Problem. In January 1997, Turkey threatened to 
veto 1 NATO enlargement and to leave the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership unless it was admitted to the EU2 but subsequently it 
.participated in the second conference of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership in Malta in March and failed to carry out its threat at the 
NATO Madrid summit in july. ..~: 
From another angle, the inclusion of the two Mediterranean island 
States in the European Union would re-introduce some balance in the 
EU's own composition by strengthening the Mediterranean dimension 
and by implication the Union's sensitivity towards the region. 
In October 1996, the general elections in Malta returned the labour 
party to government after an absence of nine years. Malta's new 
government announced that it was "freezing" the EU application. Some 
days after winning the election the labour government, which had 
1 Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, W·ashington, April 4th, 1949: "The parties 
may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State .... to accede to this 
Treaty". 
2 Europe News Bulletin, no. 6904, Brussels 3pt January, 1997, pp. 4-5. 
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campaigned under the slogan of turning Malta into a "Switzerland of the 
Mediterranean", decided to leave NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
because it was incompatible with Malta's brand of neutrality. On that 
same day, Switzerland joined the PfP. 
Before the election, the labour party's leader and Malta's current 
Prime Minister, Alfred Sant, claimed that Malta's membership of the EU 
would harm Mediterranean stability. He added that Malta's security 
could best be safeguarded by maintaining a position from which it poses 
a threat to no one, north or south.3 Malta indicated that for the 
foreseeable future it had no interest in membership, but wanted instead 
to concluQe a free trade agreement with the Union accompanied by a 
protocol providing guarantees for Malta's security. Malta was not 
represented at the Dublin summit with the other applicant countries, an 
unmistakable signal that the "structured dialogue" had come to an end. 
European Commission President, Jacques Santer, replying to a question 
by a journalist, said that Malta was no longer a candidate for 
membership4, In practice, Malta will certainly miss the next enlargement 
and therefore the question of whether the application is in fact "frozen" 
or withdrawn is an academic one. 
With Malta's decision to freeze its application and the Union's 
definite "no for the moment" to Turkey following the publication of the 
European Commission's "Agenda200Q", coupled with the forthcoming start 
of negotiations with Cyprus in 1998, the whole issue of Mediterranean 
enlargement has changed dramatically since October 1996. 
Meanwhile, after concluding the Customs Union agreement with the 
Union, Turkey has become even more assertive in its demands for 
membership and has said time and again that it would not tolerate 
Cyprus's membership of the Union5, Former Turkish Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister Mrs Tanasu Ciller has been even more specific. Just 
before the start of the Dublin summit she said that there are three reasons 
why Turkey is taking part in the next enlargement of the Union: " ... we are 
3 The Times (of Malta), October 15th, 1996. 
4 Europe News Bulletin, no. 6876, Brussels, December 16th, 1996, point 012. 
S Former Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan told journalists in Ankara 
that "The south of Cyprus cannot join the ED without the permission of Turkey 
, .. if it does so, the integration of the Turkish Republic of Cyprus into Turkey win 
be carried out as quickly as possible", Europe News Bulletin, no, 6882, Brussels, 
December 24th, 1996. 
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the first country to have signed an agreement that provides for enlargement, 
we are the only applicant that is a member of NATO, we are the only 
country that has achieved a degree of integration (with the EU) represented 
by the Customs Union that came into force just one year ago"6. Later, Mrs 
Ciller added that improved relations between the EU and Turkey would 
make the resolution of the Cypriot problem more likely7, This position was 
reiterated by the new Turkish government led by Prime Minister Mesut 
Yilmaz which succeeded the Ciller-Erbakan coalition in mid-July 1997, 
following another passive intrusion by the military in Turkish politics8, 
2. From the Launching of the Applications to the Present 
2.1 The Case of Turkey 
Turkey was the first of the trio to launch its application on the 14th 
of April 1987 and the Commission's Opinion came out at the end of 19899• 
Turkey's relations with the European Community date back to 1963, 
when it became the second Mediterranean country after Greece to sign an 
Association Agreement with the Community. As a key member of 
NATO and other Western European security arrangements and due to its 
strategic position at the head of the Dardanelles and facing the Caucasus, 
during the Cold War close links with the Community were considered 
desirable as part of the wider political and strategic aims of strengthening 
NATO's Southern flank by stabilising Turkey's internal political, 
economic and social situation. The end of the Cold War diminished 
Turkey's traditional importance for the West, though strong arguments 
can still be made about her strategic value vis-a-vis the turbuleiit Middle 
East and Central Asia, not to mention the importance of supporting and 
upholding the Turkish secular State as a model for the newly independent 
Moslem States of Central Asia. Europe cannot, however, make plans for 
6 Europe News Bulletin, no. 6874, Brussels, December 14th, 1996, p. 4. 
7 Europe News Bulletin, no. 6876, Brussels, December 16th, 1996, point 002. 
8 Europe News Bulletin, no. 7016, Brussels, July 14J15th, 1997, p. 4: the new Turkish 
government's programme stated that full membership for Turkey in the EU "is not 
only an objective but also a right derived from certain agreements". 
9 Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community, SEC 
(89) 2290 finalJ2, Brussels, December 20th, 1989. 
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Turkey as a preponderant power in the Middle East and the Caucasus 
without being ready to offer her some compensatory favour. Turkey has 
named her price; the EU has refused it. At the informal "5+1" meeting in 
Rome in January 1997, Mrs Ciller made it amply clear that Turkey was not 
interested in "a special status" in the EU as a substitute for membershiplO. 
The reasons which the EU puts forward for refusing Turkey's application are 
routinely linked to Turkey's low level of economic development, its rapidly 
growing population (with the added consideration that were it to become a 
member of the Union, Turkey could before too long become one of its most 
populous countries) and the impact that such a large underdeveloped, mainly 
agrarian country, would have on the Community'S structural funds., 
agricultural policy and budget - not to mention internal migrationll. In the 
backgrQund of course there is the Greek factor or the way Greece uses its 
EU membership to condition Turkish behaviour in general by blocking 
her membership and financial aid. 
In 1989, the EU's excuse for not starting negotiations with Turkey 
were that at that time the Community was still putting in place the Single 
Market, was about to embark on Economic and Monetary Union and 
moreover was involved in the task of "improving its institutions and 
thereby reconciling enlargement and consolidation." The Commission 
recommended that on the basis of these considerations alone" it would be 
unwise, with regard both to the candidate countries and to the Member 
States, to envisage the Community becoming involved in new accession 
negotiations before 1993 at the earliest, except in exceptional cases"12. The 
"exceptional case" was soon invoked for the European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA) applicants while Turkey's application, whose Association 
Agreement13 envisaged eventual EU membership, though not automatically, 
was put on the back burners, as were the applications - launched in 1990 
- of Cyprus and Malta. 
10 Europe News Bulletin, 6904, Brussels, 31st January, 1997. The "5+1" is made up 
of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain plus Turkey. 
11 Ibid., Commission's Opinion on Turkey's application point 8, "Economic 
Context, as well as relevant annexes." 
12 Ibid., Commission's Opinion on Turkey's application, point 4. 
13 Article 28 of the EC-Turkey Association Agreement specified that" As soon as 
the operation of this agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full 
acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the 
Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession 
of Turkey to the Community", Collection of Agreements concluded by the 
European Communities, Brussels, 1978, Vol. 3, p. 553. 
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The EU's treatment of Turkey is symptomatic of its changing 
international priorities, not least those in the Mediterranean region. Since 
the late Sixties and early Seventies, the Community had regarded the 
Mediterranean as a zone of instability whose problems could spill over 
into Europe itself. This position is now being overtly stressed by NATO, 
which has set up the Mediterranean Cooperation Group14. While military 
threats and the overall strategic balance in the region might perhaps have 
been countered by the presence of the American Sixth Fleet, the 
Community was using economic statecraft, especially discriminatory 
trading preferences under the aegis of its Global Mediterranean Policy, to 
enhance stability in the region, essentially by trying to alleviate the non-
military threats15• The accession of Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) 
to the EC consolidated the new democratic process began in each of these 
States in the first half of the Seventies. In the late Eighties, at the time of 
Turkey's application, no such prerogatives existed which would have 
motivated the EC to include her in its fold. Moreover, the focus of the EU 
had shifted markedly to internal consolidation, while externally it became 
preoccupied with two main issues: the successful consolidation of Western 
European integration by linking the EFTA countries with it through the 
European Economic Area (EEA) and the e,:ents in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Then came the negotiation and ratification of the Treaty of 
Maastricht, the start of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) followed 
by accession negotiations with the EFfA group and the conclusion of 
Europe Agreements with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
These events also negatively affected the applications of Cyprus and Malta. 
Moreover, the emerging problems and priorities in the Mediterranean 
region, to which the EU was admittedly rather slow to react - population 
growth, migratory pressures on Europe, terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and 
the spread of Islamic fundamentalism - lessened Turkey's attJactiveness, 
the perception being that Turkey could possibly aggravate rather than 
diminish some if not all of these pressures. Turkish intransigence on Cyprus 
and its dismal human rights record did not help either. Lurking under the 
14 NORDAM J., "The Mediterranean Dialogue: Dispelling Misconceptions and 
Building Confidence", NATO Review, 4, July-August, 1997, pp. 26-29. 
15 Of course it remains a mute point as to how relevant the EU's Mediterranean 
Policy has been in maintaining regional stability and how much it has contributed 
towards the maintenance of the colonial relations between the European 
metropolitan core and the peripheral States in the post-colonial era. 
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surface was the cultural question, namely that although Turkey has Western 
institutions of government and legal system established by Kemal Attaturk, 
it is an Islamic country16. Ironically, when in the Seventies the international 
environment was potentially favourable towards Turkey, the latter was 
rather lukewarm17 to the idea of membership while Greece successfully 
pressed for membership. In the late Eighties and Nineties, Turkey is 
enthusiastic about membership; the EU, however, is not. 
Human rights have always played an important role in the Union's 
dealings with the Mediterranean associates18• Given this emphasis, when 
the European Parliament's statutory approval was sought fgr the EU-
Turkeyt-:Customs Union agreement and the financial protocol in 
December 1995, Turkey's Human rights record came under attack in the 
Parliament, with the leader of the socialist group stating most 
emphatically that the majority of her group were voting in favour of 
ratification " .. .in sorrow, with heavy hearts and without enthusiasm"19. 
The Customs Union agreement was accompanied by a financial aid 
package made up of ECU 375 million in budgetary aid and ECU 750 
million in EIB loans. However, following the events of January 1996 
around Imia island in the Aegean, this aid was blocked at the insistence 
of Greece. In July, the European Council issued a declaration20 on 
16 REDMOND JOHN, The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European 
Community: Turkey, Cyprus and Malta? Dartmouth, 1993, pp. 45-46. 
17 The disenchantment with the whole relationship was clear when the Turkish 
Foreign Minister said in 1974 that his country did not share Greece's urgency in 
joining the EC. Again, during those years Turkey constantly complained with the 
Community that it was biased towards Greece in the Aegean dispute. Relations 
with the Community were worsened by the 1974 invasion of Cyprus. Further 
difficulties in the EC-Turkey relationship were introduced by the intervention of 
the Turkish military in domestic politics and the general deterioration in the human 
rights situation. 
18 The agreement with Greece had been frozen after the colonels' coup in 1967., 
while Spain's request for an Association Agreement based on article 238 were 
rebuffed pending substantial progress in democratisation. It was only after Franco's 
death that relations between the EC and Spain were gradually normalised. Human -
Rights were a frequent bone of contention between the EU and Turkey following 
the intervention of the Turkish military in the political affairs of the country. 
Besides, the respect for human rights is now a binding feature of the Europe 
Agreements and the new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreements. 
19 Pauline Green, European Socialists, Debates of the European Parliament, OJ 
Annex no. 4-472, 13th December, 1995, p. 144. 
20 The Council's Declaration was published in the Bulletin of the European Union, 
no. 7/8, Brussels 1996, point 1.4.27, pp. 97-98. 
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relations between the EU and Turkey including a reference to the Imia 
islet incident and calling for the avoidance of any action liable to increase 
tensions and specifically against the use of force. Turkey was asked whether 
it would commit itself to the principles stated in the declaration, but the reply 
was slow in coming. The Commission has also referred to the lack of 
legislative initiative in Turkey, which has resulted in no progress being made 
on democratic reforms and fundamental human rights. Turkey has pleaded 
that it is going through an awkward time in its history when it has to fight the 
"terrorist" movement of the Kurds (PKK) which in Turkish eyes has 
criminal connections. The EU's reply is that the fight against terrorism 
does not release Turkey from the obligation to respect human rights. 
2.2 Cyprus and Malta 
Cyprus and Malta had become interested in concluding an 
Association Agreement with the Community in 1961, following Britain's 
first application to join, an aim both achieved some ten years later21. Their 
level of economic development is at least comparable with that of some 
of the other Southern EU member States. Wit~ popUlations of 0.4 million 
and 0.7 million respectively, Malta and Cyprus are unimportant for the 
EU either as markets or as regards their impact on the Community's 
finances and other main economic policies22. This was more or less 
confirmed by the Commission's Opinions on their applications published 
in 199323, in which, however, a number of economic sectors in each State 
were identified as requiring modernisation in preparation for 
membership. On the basis of these observations, a "Structured Dialogue" 
commenced between the Union and each of the applicants to usher in the 
priority reforms. This dialogue is still going on with Cyprus, but not with 
Malta as a consequence of its shift on EU membership. 
21 Malta in 1970, Cyprus in 1971. 
22 In a document entitled Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement, presented by 
the Commission to the European Council in Lisbon in June, 1992, it was stated that 
" ... the integration of Cyprus and Malta into the Community system would not pose 
insurmountable problems of an economic nature", Bulletin of the European 
Communities, Supplement 3/92, Brussels, 1992, p. 13. 
23 Commission Opinion on Malta's Application for Membership, COM (93) 312 
final, Brussels, 30th June, 1993; Commission's Opinion on the Application by the 
Republic of Cyprus for Membership, COM (93) 313 final, Brussels, 30th June, 1993. 
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The Commission also referred to the additional difficulty concerning 
the impact of their membership, both being micro-States, on the Union's 
institutions24• This followed from the position adopted by the EU at the 
Lisbon European Council of June 1992, when the Benelux countries 
urged the EC to tackle the institutional issue in a way that would not be 
detrimental to smaller countries. The Benelux trio made it clear that as a 
consequence of this membership should be immediately open to the 
EFTA countries, but not to the Mediterranean applicants25• This killed 
any hope there might have been of an early entry of either one or both of 
the Medi.t~rranean applicants. This hope had arisen from the fact that, 
::.. . 
since the "'Community had always insisted that each application should be 
treated on its merits, the Maltese authorities26 had been encouraged to 
believe in early accession together with the EFTA group without having 
to wait for Cyprus27 • As for Cyprus, the Commission declared that there 
is a link between the question of enlargement and the problem that results 
from the de facto separation of the island into two entities28• 
When presenting its application, the Cypriot government did so on 
behalf of the whole island. In line with the relevant UN resolutions, the 
ED recognises only the government of the Republic of Cyprus and not the 
administration of the Northern Turkish part, the so-called Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) established in 1983 and recognised 
only by Turkey. The Turkish-Cypriot authorities do not believe that the 
Nicosia government has the right to negotiate on behalf of the whole 
island. They base their legal position on the Geneva Treaty of Guarantee 
24 Ibid., Commission's Report, Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement, point 31, 
pp. 17-18. 
25 See the Benelux Memorandum submitted to the European Council of Lisbon 
(26 and 27 June, 1992) in which it was stated that "As for other applicants for 
accession (Turkey, Malta and Cyprus), the Commission could be asked to make 
proposals designed to give substance to 'strengthened Association Agreements", 
Europe Documents no. 1789, Agence Europe, Brussels, June 1978. 
26 In its 1992 Electoral Manifesto, the nationalist party had declared that it was 
confident that Malta would join the European Union with the first group of 
countries. See, "Solidarjeta, Dejjem ... Kulimkien", Partit Nazzjonalista, 1992, p. 9l. 
27 This was encouraged by such pronouncements as that by Commission President, 
Jacques Delors, in an interview with the French newspaper Liberation of Sep-
tember 14th, 1992: "There is a country one sometimes forgets which is very important 
as a symbol: Malta. We must not displace Europe too much towards the North while 
forgetting the South: we risk losing our sensitivity to the Mediterranean world which 
is our world, but which at present cumulates danger for the future of all of us." 
28 Ibid., point 30, p. 17. 
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and the 1960 Cypriot Constitution29, according to which the President and 
vice President of Cyprus, the latter (constitutionally) a Turkish Cypriot, 
each have a veto over any foreign policy decision, particularly on joining 
an international organisation or alliance that does not count both Greece 
and Turkey among its members30. In its Opinion on the Cypriot 
application the Commission came out strongly against the prospect of the 
Union "internalising" the Cyprus Problem, reiterating clearly that 
accession negotiations with Cyprus could only begin after a solution to the 
problem had been found31 • However, should the inter communal talks 
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots not lead anywhere, the 
Commission proposed that the situation should be reassessed and the 
question of Cyprus's accession to the Community be reconsidered in 
January 199532, This prevented Turkey from gaining complete leverage on 
Cyprus and Greece and to a lesser extent on the ED itself. Had Cypriot 
membership of the ED and a solution of the Cyprus Problem been linked 
open endedly, something Greece would never have permitted, Turkey 
might have used Cyprus as a hostage until its aims had been fully met. 
In Malta's case, the Commission's main additional observation was 
that although the Maltese government had affirmed that it is in Malta's 
interest to subscribe to the Common Foreign and Security Policy' 
(CFSP), this does not alter the fact that it might be necessary to amend 
the constitution which incorporates Malta's neutral status based on 
non-alignment33• Such an amendment requires a two-thirds majority in 
Parliament. When the nationalist party was in power, Malta consistently 
maintained that its neutrality was sui generis and that, just as other neutral 
States were participating in the ED, Malta would have no difficulties in 
doing the same with its brand of neutrality34, However, the labour party 
> • 
. ~. 
29 Draft Constitution of Cyprus, Cmnd. 1093, July 1960, article 50, p. 112: "The 
President and vice-President of the Republic, separately or conjointly, shall have 
the right of final veto on any-law or decision of the House of Representatives or 
any part thereof concerning: (a) foreign affairs, except the participation of the 
Republic in international organisations and pacts of alliance in which the Kingdom 
of Greece and the Republic of Turkey both participate". 
30 Point 8, p. 4, Commission's Opinion on the Application of Cyprus. 
31 Ibid., point 47, p. 23. 
32 Ibid., point 51, p. 24. 
33 Points 17-19, pp. 9-10, Commission's Opinion on Malta's Application. 
34 For a brief discussion of the issues involved, see Pace R., "Assessing Malta's Bid 
to Join The European Union: The Case in Favour", University of Reading Discussion 
Paper in European and International Social Science Research, no. 54, July 1995. 
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has continuously maintained that membership could have a detrimental 
effect on stability in the Mediterranean and on Malta's neutrality. 
In June 1994 an important development took place when, on the 
insistence of Greece, the Corfu European Council established that the 
next EU enlargement would include Cyprus and Malta35 , At the end of 
the summit, Greek Minister Theodoros Pangalos noted that the Council's 
decision meant that "the question of the admission of Cyprus, was 
disassociated from the political problem of Cyprus"36. In the first half of 
1995, Greece blocked progress on the ~U-Turkey Customs Union 
agreement and the transfer of EC financial aid to Turkey in order to force 
the latteJt..to drop its opposition to Cyprus joining the EU before the 
Cyprus Question had been resolved. At the same time Greece put 
pressure on its EU partners to fix a date for the opening of negotiations 
with· Malta and Cyprus. After a decision reached within the General 
Affairs Council in April, the Cannes European Council of June 1995 
reaffirmed that negotiations with Cyprus and Malta would begin six 
months after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), taking 
into account the outcome of the Conference37, Negotiations with Cyprus 
are now to begin in the first half of 1998. 
Initially there was some confusion over the state of relations between 
the EU and Malta following the October 1996 election, In November 
1996, a member of the CO REPER in Brussels was reported to have said 
that there was no point in continuing the Structured Dialogue with Malta 
once it had ceased to be interested in membership38. The government's 
position was stated in an aide memoire39 to all EU member States: Malta 
reiterated that its foreign policy will remain oriented towards Europe 
while at the same time cultivating a complementary Mediterranean 
policy. The Foreign Minister visited Brussels and addressed the General 
Affairs Council, explaining that the membership application had been put 
"on hold" and that Malta was fundamentally in favour of European 
integration;though the present government did not see any role for Malta 
35 Conclusions of the Presidency, Corfu European Summit, 24th and 25th June 
1994, Doc. SN 150/94, p. 14. 
36 Reported in "Europe", Special Edition, no. 6260, Agence Europe, Brussels, 26th 
June, 1994, p. 4. 
37 Conclusions of the Presidency, Cannes European Summit. 
38 The Times (of Malta), November 19th, 1996. 
39 The Department of Information, Valletta, on the 23rd November, 1996 published 
the aide memoire. 
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in it for the foreseeable future. The Council instructed the Commission to 
begin consultations with Malta with a view to eventually starting 
negotiations aimed at establishing a new agreement40• Italy expressed 
disappointment at Malta's change of policy, but promised that it would help 
Malta achieve its aim of a closer relationship with the EU. Interviewed by a 
Maltese journalist during the Irish European summit, Italian Prime Minister 
Romano Prodi was reported to have said that Italy regarded the 
Mediterranean expansion as being very important because the Union could 
not be an association of Northern European countries only. He added that 
Italy would always be close to Malta, but the latter's change of policy over 
Europe meant that they would be less close. He reiterated the hope that 
Malta would eventually change its stance once again on the issue41 • 
-3. The Impact of the Next Mediterranean Enlargement on the European 
Union and on the Mediterranean Applicants 
One way to consider the impact of EU membership on the 
Mediterranean applicants is to frame the arguments in the context of the 
"costs of non-membership", something that will be attempted in this 
section. The EU's reluctance to include the Mediterranean applicants 
together with the EFT A group, couched in terms of the negative impact 
that this would have on the Union's institutions, was a screen behind 
which the Union said no to Turkey because it was too big and 
underdeveloped, no to Cyprus because of the Cyprus Problem and no to 
Malta because it could not say yes to her while saying no to Cyprus. The 
question of institutional reform, specifically reducing the democratic 
deficit and increasing the effectiveness of the institutions, is .. a crucial issue, 
'. ~r 
especially in the context of enlargement. Concurrently and paradoxically 
it was the ED itself which applied asymmetric treatment to the applicants 
on this issue when it waived the question of prior institutional reform in 
the case of the EFT Ans but insisted on it in the case of the Mediterranean 
applicants, even though dealing with this problem could possibly have 
been left until a later stage as was the case with the EFTA countries42• 
40 The Times (of Malta), November 26th, 1996. 
41 The Sunday Times (of Malta), December 15th, 1996. 
42 See for example the Joint Declaration on the Institutional Procedures of the 
Accession Treaties with the EFTA applicants: "In adopting the institutional 
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The economic impact on the Community of the entry of Cyprus and 
Malta would be expected to be negligible. In the hypothetical case of 
Turkey's membership, the Union will gain access to a large market -
larger, in population terms, than that incorporated in the Union with the 
first Mediterranean enlargement. Turkey's population, being relatively 
young and growing, may produce migratory pressures on the rest of 
Europe. The Turkish economy has been expanding faster than the OECD 
average in recent years; during the 1996 calendar year GDP expanded by 
7.25 per cent in real terms. Unemployment, currently at 6.8 per cent and 
predicted to fall during 1996, compares favourably with most OECD 
economies.43 However, as Emmanuel Carpentier has argued, behind 
Turkey's apparent economic well-being lies another reality that threatens 
the wholei. ~organism, that of chronic inflation, tax evasion, fiscal 
mismanagement, deficit budgeting, a large State sector and a parallel 
economy, all in brief economic structural imbalances. It is these that 
Europe needs fear and not whether the Kemalist institutions will resist the 
challenge of change44• This analysis has been arrived at by other 
prominent writers45• 
The most serious challenge of enlargement will be to the Union's 
finances and especially the structural funds. While in this regard the entry 
of Cyprus and Malta is unimportant for the EU, the three applicants' level 
of development entitles them, on the basis of present rules, for each to be 
considered as a single Objective One region, which, taking into account 
the size of Turkey's population, would entitle it to about six times the 
current transfers to Greece. Considering the aid from the structural funds, 
membership is a definite positive advantage for the applicants and a 
provisions of the Accession Treaty, member States and the applicant countries 
agree that, as well as examining the legislative role of the European Parliament and 
other matters envisaged in the Treaty on European Union, the Intergovernmental 
Conference to be convened in 1996 will consider the questions relating to the 
number of members of the European Commission and the weighting of the votes 
of the member States in Council. It will also consider any measures deemed 
necessary to facilitate the work of the institutions and guarantee their effective 
operation", OJ C 241, Vol. 37, 29th August, 1994, p. 383. 
43 For a brief analysis of the Turkish economy, see "OEeD Economic Outlook", 
61, June 1977, pp. 114-116. 
44 CARPENTIER E., "La Turqie: adolescente de l'Europe", Societal, 4, January 1997, 
pp.21-26. 
45 See for example, EDWARD MORTIMER, "Disenchanted Paradise", The Financial 
Times, June 4,1997, p. 10. 
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headache for the Union, which will also have to tackle the challenges of 
integrating the Central and Eastern European countries. By contrast, the 
counterfactual situation of staying out of the Union but at the same time 
maintaining links with her in the ambit of the EU's Mediterranean Policy 
does not open up as many trade and economic development advantages 
as membership would for the Mediterranean applicants, especially as 
regards financial aid and technical assistance to strengthen their national 
development effort. 
There is also the question of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In this 
regard the choice between membership and non-membership is not 
neutral. The applicant countries in Central and Eastern Europe will 
exercise a strong gravitational pull on FDI to the comparative detriment 
of the Mediterranean applicants should these opt to stay out of the EU. 
Mediterranean backward regions of the EU, which receive aid from the 
structl:1ral funds,. also compete directly with non-member States for FDI. 
On the Union's side there is the question of the Mediterranean 
applicants' readiness to join the last stage of EMU. Following the Lisbon 
European summit of June 1992, the EU has adopted the stance that in 
enlargement negotiations the requirements of membership are to be 
based on the Treaty on European Union and now presumably on the new 
Treaty of Amsterdam when that is finally ratified. Therefore applicant 
countries are to make parallel progress on achieving membership and in 
ushering in the changes needed to integrate fully in the Union. Both 
Cyprus46 and Malta have claimed that they are within easy reach of 
achieving the Maastricht nominal convergence criteria and therefore their 
membership should not present problems to the Union in this regard. 
Cyprus is closer to achieving a fiscal deficit of around 3.0 p~r cent of GDP, 
one of the main convergence criteria, than is Malta, ·~·whose deficit 
presently stands at around 9.3 per cent of GDP. For Cyprus and Malta, 
achieving the Maastricht criteria is not a painless task and though the 
authorities in both applicant countries have been optimistic in the past, 
more sanguine appraisals of the situation have been aired in both 
countries. Theophanous47 has argued that in the case of one of the criteria, 
46 Cypriot Finance Minister, Christodou10s Christodolou was reported to have told 
a seminar that Cyprus had managed to achieve all five Maastricht nominal 
convergence criteria. Cyprus Bulletin, Vol. XXXIV, no. 3, February 6th, 1996. 
47 See for example THEOPHANOUS A., "Cyprus and The European Union: From 
Customs Union to Membership", The Cyprus Review, Vol. 7, no. 2, Fall 1995, pp. 
74 ff. 
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i.e. public debt, if due consideration is taken of intra-government debt, 
total public debt would amount to 88.7 per cent of GDP in Cyprus. 
Cordina48 has pointed out a number of difficulties in Malta's case but 
primarily to the ones connected with establishing the real size of public 
debt, problems with controlling inflation and long-term interest rates and 
lastly difficulties with determining the exchange rate of the Maltese lira, 
presently established by the Central Bank on the basis of a formula of a 
basket of currencies. Since the weight of the ECU in the basket is around 
two thirds, it is not surprising that the Maltese lira has been so stable 
against the ECU. Since 1996, the Maltese economy has entered a 
recession the duration of which cannot be forecast with confidence, but 
which will ~ertainly push Malta further away from achieving the criteria. 
:»- ~ 
In any case, in the context of future enlargement, countries that are 
unprepared for EMU will be related to it by virtue of the EMS 2 until such 
time as they are ready to join. 
Traditionally Turkey has been a high inflation economy49. No doubt 
the effects of the Customs Union and liberalisation may exercise a 
downward pressure on prices in the long run, but in the short to medium 
term the effects will be more mixed. In addition, pressures are already 
being felt on Turkey's current account balance as a result of the Customs 
Union with the EU. Longer-term interest rates remain high. Neither the 
government's financial deficit as a percentage of GDP nor public 
borrowing is being contained. Turkey will need a very long time to 
achieve the criteria for the final stage of EMU even though the new 
government in Turkey may exercise better management of the economy 
than the previous Islamic-led one. . 
On the political side there is the question of the applicants' 
participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the 
EU. In this respect, Turkey is the least problematic, being a full member 
of NATO and an associate member of the Western European Union 
(WEU). In international politics Cyprus was a co-founder of the 
48 CORDINA GORDON, "Malta and EMU: Prospects For Sustainable Convergence" in 
XUEREB P.G. and PACE R., "The European Union, the IGC and The 
Mediterranean", EDRC, University of Malta, 1996, pp. 205 ff. 
49 "OECD Economic Outlook", no. 61, Paris, June 1997, Annex Table 14, (A 17) 
GDP Deflators. The general price level peaked at 107.0 per cent in 1994 but started 
declining thereafter. Present estimates show that it would go down to 65.0 per cent 
in 1998. Inflation at that level, even if achieved will still be extremely high by EU 
standards when the EU average is expected to be 1.9 per cent in 1998. 
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non-aligned movement (NAM) and remains an active participant in it. 
Malta joined the NAM much later. The NAM has enabled both applicants 
to forge political links with the developing countries, some of which they 
were already linked to through the British Commonwealth. So far, these 
relations do not appear to have translated into trade opportunities, which 
remain directed towards the geographically proximate regions. They have 
actively participated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) and have worked closely with the European 
neutral and non-aligned States, some of which are now members of the 
EU while others are waiting to join. Thus they are not complete novices 
to the problems of European security and as micro-States they view the 
Union as a "security community". Being on the edges of the EU's security 
sphere, the accession of Cyprus and Malta could potentially make the 
core countries more ~ensitive to the problems of the Union's Southern 
periphery. One 'objection that could be put forward is that their 
"neutralism" could further hamper the EU's CFSP. However, the Draft 
Treaty of Amsterdam has found an accommodating niche for neutrals 
without stalling the decision-making process. 
In the case of Malta, the Labour party has expressed fears of the 
island being transformed into a fortress on the European frontier, 
guarding against the Arab world50• The Maltese government holds that in 
the present condition in the Mediterranean region neutrality serves 
towards safeguarding Malta's security and identity in the event of a North! 
South conflict. This argument would have been reasonably valid if not for 
the consideration that, since Malta is unable to safeguard its own security, 
it has to seek military guarantees from neighbouring powers and thus 
become indirectly involved in regional military arrangements which, if 
they do not constitute alliances in the strict meaning of., the term, are 
nevertheless close to so being. The Nationalist Administnitl'on of 1987-96 
had declared that in the post-Cold War era, neutrality had lost most if not 
all of its meaning and that neutral countries were rethinking their 
international status. Malta's security is currently guaranteed by Italy and 
Russia (as the successor State to the USSR). However, the guarantors' 
intervention in the defence of Malta is not automatic and there is always 
the possibility that these stronger States may choose not to act in the event 
50 Malta Labour Party, "Foreign Policy Document" (undated but probably 1995-
96), p. 3. 
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of a threat to Malta's security/neutrality should wider interests prevail. 
Malta could eventually see its strategic reliance on Italy, already 
accompanied by an economic dependence resulting from the financial and 
economic aid which Italy has transferred to Malta over the past 15 years, 
transformed into a hegemonic relationship. By contrast, membership of 
the ED, which is not a military alliance but a security community, holds 
lesser risks all round and does not require Malta to abandon its policy of 
neutrality. 
While in opposition the Malta Labour party had also proposed 
cooperation with the EU in matters related to security and foreign policy 
as part of its proposed alternative package of relations with the EU, 
falling just' short of membershipsl. Indeed, when meeting the heads of the 
diplomatic missions of the NATO countries in Malta soon after the 1996 
elections, the new Foreign Minister, George Vella, explained that Malta's 
exit from the PfP was "not a political measure aimed at distancing Malta 
from Europe"s2. Later, the Minister said that Malta was not turning its 
back on Europe and that there was no need for a formal withdrawal of the 
EU membership application. He added that Malta would be continuing 
where the previous government had left off, taking on board what had 
already been agreed and seeking to build on it53• Speaking to the Chamber 
of Commerce, Prime Minister Alfred Sant said that "for the foreseeable 
future we are ruling out the prospect of Maltese membership of the EU in 
the full belief that on a net basis, such membership would be in the interest 
neither of Malta nor of Europe"s4. 
Support for EU membership in Malta is still very strong, with 
unofficial public opinion surveys showing that it runs across party lines. 
The electorate has not really been tested on the matter, despite the claims 
made by both main political parties. The private enterprise organisations, 
such as the Federation of Industry (FOI) and the Chamber of Commerce, 
maintain that it is in Malta's interest to join the European Union. In 
representations to the political parties just before the election, the FOI 
warned that "it does not make sense for Malta to stand alone in splendid 
51 Electoral Programme of the Malta labour party entitled Ic-Cittadin I-Ewwel: 
Vizjoni ghal Malta Moderna, October 1996, p. 2. 
52 The Times (of Malta), November 1st, 1996. 
53 The Times (of Malta), November 9th, 1996. 
54 Honourable Dr Alfred Sant (Prime Minister), "Malta's Modern Way Forward", 
Department of Information, Valletta, December 11th, 1996, p. 5. 
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isolation when its competitors ... are uniting under the aegis of different 
regional economic blocs"ss. Following the election, the FOI said in a 
meeting with the newly appointed Minister for Industry that uncertainty 
over Malta's relations with the EU would harm investment56 • In 
September 1997, Lino Spiteri, former socialist Finance Minister, 
lambasted the government on its EU and tax reform policies, showing for 
the first time that cracks have begun to appear in the ruling party's 
position. Spiteri's public foray57 elicited a lengthy statement of support 
from the Federation of Industries and other organisations. 
"In February 1998, the European Commission presented the Maltese 
Government with its proposal for a new EU-Malta agreement leading 
eventually to a free trade area on the model of the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership. The proposed agreement will be based on the 1970 
Association Agreement and no reference to a security protocol has been 
made, as was to be expected. 
Given the EU's other priorities - ratification of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam and embarking on the final stage of EMU, and the 
enlargement negotiations with the countries which are willing to go on 
with the process negotiations with Malta will be treated in the same 
manner as those with other Mediterranean countries and consequently 
delayed. It will also be difficult for Malta to negotiate a sui generis 
relationship with the Union, first of all because the Brussels bureaucracy 
will find it difficult to place Malta in anything other than an already 
existing pigeon hole - in other words a Mediterranean Partnership 
Agreement, a "Europe Agreement" or an EEA, EFTA-type one. 
Moreover, the political will may be lacking on the part of the EU: in 
forging a relationship with Malta, the EU may find it difficult to depart 
from the beaten track, for this would raise serious Rrecedents in its 
relations with other non-member countries. There is a:- historic negative 
precedent as well: Malta's 1981 request for a "special relationship" with 
the Be, proposed by Dom Mintoff, was rejected by the Community and 
subsequently bilateral relations entered a very difficult period. 
The final consideration concerns Malta's security in and outside the 
Union. Malta's membership of the EU would not affect the Union either 
way. However, the reverse is not the case. Today there is quasi-
SS The FOI memorandum was published in The Times of October 17th, 1996. The 
original copy was used for the purposes of this study. 
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unanimous ,consensusS8 that the major threats to security in the 
Mediterranean are of a non-military nature. Most of the States of the 
Southern Mediterranean littoral are concerned with internal security 
issues widely related to the possibility of State collapse because of the 
deteriorating economic situation and the protest against the leading 
political elites in each country, under the banner - probably a banner of 
convenience -' of I~lam. There are also the classic flash points such as the 
Middle East, Cyprus and the situation in the Aegean (to mention but a 
few) which could erupt at any time. However, the likely effects of the 
latter remain by and large limited to a sub-region of the Mediterranean. 
Another source of potential conflict comes from unresolved border issues 
and the demarcation of the continental shelves. Malta is involved in such 
a dispute wiffi both Libya and Tunisia. The North-South relations in the 
Mediterranean region are much less antagonistic then in the past. The 
States of the Northern littoral are not perceived as a military threat by the 
Southern Mediterranean countries (except in Tripoli) but as an essential 
partner whose intrusive intervention is not feared, but rather its lack of 
interest59• This view is collaborated by Monika Wohlfeld who claims that 
the Southern States, whilst viewing the development of the security and 
defence capabilities of the Northern Mediterranean States with suspicion, 
still broadly misinterpreting such WEUINATO activities as military 
exercises and the possibility of humanitarian operations in the 
Mediterranean regions, are nevertheless concerned that the Western 
organisations' increased interest in Central and Eastern Europe may 
develop at their expense60 • The Maltese labour party's view that " ... when 
56 The Times (of Malta), November 12th, 1996. 
57 His articles appeared on The Times (of Malta) on September 17th, 18th and 
19th, 1997. 
58 For a comprehensive assessment of the situation in the Mediterranean region see 
for example, "Nato's Southern Flank: Report together with the Proceedings of the 
Committee Relating to the Report, Minutes of Evidence and Memorandum", 
Defence Committee, Third Report, House of Commons, HMSO, March 13th, 1996. 
59 VASCONCELOS ALVARO, "Security in Northern Africa: Ambiguity and Reality -
General Framework and Concepts", in VASCONCELOS A. and FARIA F. (eds.) 
"Security in Northern Africa: Ambiguity and Reality", Chaillot Papers no. 25, 
Institute for Security Studies, WEU, September 1996, p. 14. 
60 WOHLFELD MONIKA, "A Survey of Strategic Interests of the Countries of the 
European Security Space" in LENZI G. and MARTIN L. (eds.) "The European 
Security Space", Working Paper of the European Strategy Group and the Institute 
of Security Studies of the WEU, December 1996, p. 14. 
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one considers the problems of our region and the rift and tension which 
exist between the North and South, [and which J have paradoxically 
escalated since the end of the Cold War" does not appear to square with 
the facts61 • 
4. The Problems of Cyprus 
Accession negotiations with Cyprus will commence, it is hoped, in 
1998. The main obstacle to the membership of Cyprus was for a long time 
the "Cyprus Problem". The rudiments of this problem are as follows62: 
(i) if Cyprus joins the EU, without a solution to the Cyprus problem first 
being found, Turkey has repeatedly promised annexation of the 
Northern Republic of Cyprus in the shortest possible time63• It will 
mean that Turkey, an applicant for future membership, with a 
customs union agreemen.t with the ED, will have annexed a part of 
-the Community'S territory. This will ensure that the issue will be a 
permanent feature of the European Council. Former British 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Malcolm 
Rifkind, had stated that no third party would have a veto on Cyprus 
joining the European Union, though if a solution were found to the 
Cyprus Problem it would make accession negotiations easier64; 
(ii) Turkey claims that Cypriot constitution prohibits Cyprus from 
joining the EU. However, by virtue of another development, 
following the signing of the Customs Union agreement with the EU, 
Turkey should be banning exports from the TRNC since, on the basis 
of a European Court decision65 of July 5th 1994, ci~~us fruits and 
61 Ibid., Foreign Policy Document of the MLP, op. cit., (undated) [1995-96], p. 3. 
62 For a comprehensive treatment of the various initiatives taken on the Cyprus 
Problem, reference to which will be made in this part of the paper, see the "Report 
on the Situation in Cyprus: Recent Political Developments", Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe, Doc 7206, December 15th, 1994. Rapporteur: Lord 
Finsberg. An earlier draft of this report had been criticised by the Greek Cypriots. 
63 The most recent of such threats was made in July 1997 when a series of steps was 
announced jointly by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot authorities on the partial 
economic integration of Northern Cyprus with Turkey and joint partnership in the 
fields of security, defence and foreign policy. This in effect amounts to the 
legalisation of the de facto situation between the two. 
64 Reported in the Cyprus Bulletin, Vol. XXXIV, no. 9, April 29th, 1996. 
65 Case C-432/92 the Court ruled: "The agreement of 19th December, 1972 
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potatoes from Cyprus should not be exported to the EU's customs 
territory unless accompanied by the proper certification issued by the 
competent (in this case Greek, Cypriot) authorities66• Turkey's 
position is thus weakened since it cannot stress one legal point while 
ignoring the other. 
A solution to the Cyprus Problem has also become elusive. In 
December 1993, the EU appointed its observer to the UN -sponsored 
peace talks, a move opposed by both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. 
However, by that time, the inter communal talks had reached stalemate and 
the Security Council of the UN blamed this on the military balance between 
the two sides. As a way of breaking out of the impasse, in 1993 the Cypriot 
President Clerides wrote to UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, 
proposing ilil; :'demilitarisation of Cyprus based on six major principles67• The 
Greek Cypriots claimed that if demilitarisation were not possible, the 
Turkish military presence in Cyprus would force the Greek Cypriots to 
purchase more arms and request Greece to include her in the Greek 
defensive plans. The demilitarisation proposals included the Turkish army 
withdrawing from Cyprus while the Turkish Cypriots were to disband their 
own forces in line with what the Greek Cypriots proposed to do on their part. 
Cyprus affirmed that if these proposals were not accepted, it would be 
incumbent on it to "increase the defensive capabilities of the Republic and to 
enter into arrangements with Greece regarding a common defensive plan"6B. 
establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and the 
Republic of Cyprus, annexed to Council Regulation no. 1246n3 of 14th May, 1973 
and Council Directive 77/93fEEC of December 21, 1976 on protective measures 
against the introduction into member States of organisms harmful to plants or plant 
products must be interpreted as precluding acceptance by national authorities of a 
member State, when citrus fruit and potatoes are imported from the part of Cyprus 
to the North of the UN buffer zone~ of movement and phytosanitary certificates 
issues by authorities other then the competent authorities of the Republic of Cyprus'~. 
66 DODD C.H., The Cyprus Issue: A Current Perspective, 2nd edition, Eothen Press, 
1995, p. 19. Dodd quoted former Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit saying that 
for this reason, "the Cyprus file should be closed". 
67 (a) Disbanding of the national guard; (b) maintenance of the police force of the 
Republic at its present numerical level and armed with light arms; (c) undertake 
the total cost of a substantially increased UN peace-keeping force; (d) the UN peace-
keeping force will have the right of inspection to ensure compliance; (e) the National 
Guard heavy armour vehicles to be used to patrol the buffer zone by the UN; (f) 
deposit with the UN the difference between the money saved from disbanding the 
National Guard and the money used to pay for the increased UN force. 
68 Cyprus Bulletin, Press and Information Office, Nicosia, Vol. XXXII, no. 1, 
January 5th, 1994. 
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By early 1994 both Cypriot communities were showing readiness to 
embark on confidence building measures (CBMs) suggested by the UN 
Secretary General way back in 199269• However, when the EU observer 
visited the island in February, the Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktash 
refused to meet him. The first round of "proximity talks" to implement 
the CBMs between leaders of the two communities took place in Nicosia 
on March 1st, 1994. Both the UN Security Council70 and the EU urged 
that the talks should not be protracted and that they should be concluded 
by the end of March. In a report to the Security Council released on April 
5th, 1994, the UN Secretary General showed that the talks were 
deadlocked and a month later he pronounced them dead, largely due to 
Turkish Cypriot intransigence71, which was confirmed by Lord Finsberg's 
report to the General Assembly of the Council of Europe72• This was 
followed in June 1994 by the decision of the EU Corfu Council that Malta 
and Cyprus would be included in the next enlargement. Then, on July 5th, 
came the European Court decision curtailing EU imports of Turkish-
Cypriot citrus fruits and potatoes73• At this point Greece and Cyprus 
began to coordinate their efforts more closely on the Cypriot EU 
application, claiming that that membership would facilitate the resolution 
of the Cyprus Problem, thus benefiting both Cypriot communities. By 
Apri11995, through Greece's efforts and most especially its blocking. of 
further progress on the EU-Turkey Customs Union agreement, the 
desired result was achieved, the EU deciding to begin accession 
negotiations with Cyprus and Malta six months after the end of the I GC. 
In the meantime, the stalemate in the intercommunal talks meant 
that neither the CBMs nor the Greek Cypriot offer of demilitarisation 
stood a chance of being actualised; meanwhile the arms ra~e on the island 
had been intensified by Cyprus' acquisition of French W-40 surface-to-
surface Exocet missiles. Cooperation between Greece and Cyprus under 
69 One of the suggested CBMs involved placing Varosha, now a ghost town 
surrounded by Turkish occupied territory, under UN administration and chambers 
of commerce of both sides would decide on, develop and promote joint projects. 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots would be free to enter the area while foreigners w()uld 
enjoy freedom of movement. 
70 UN Security Council Resolution, no. 90211994. 
71 Document S/1994/629 of May 31st, 1994. 
72 See points 96 and 98 of the Finsberg report, op. cit. 
73 The ECJ's decision was reinforced by a British High Court decision of November 
11th, 1994. 
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the aegis of the 1994 Joint Defence Agreement was intensified with the 
pledge to a "joint struggle against all adversaries"74. In June 1995, the UN 
Secretary General proposed Turkish troop reductions in Cyprus and a 
freeze in defence spending by the Greek Cypriots. Again, Cyprus 
reiterated its call for demilitarisation7s• In the meantime, work started on 
the construction of an air base near Paphos for the permanent 
deployment of Greek military aircraft, while the Greek side was reported 
to have obtained an unspecified number of T-80 tanks from Russia. On 
the diplomatic front, the USA and the EU continued with several 
unsuccessful efforts to find a solution to the impasse. In May 1996, Greek 
Foreigq)vlinister Theodoros Pangalos described the Cyprus Problem as 
the only factor preventing trust between Greece and Turkey76. In June 
1996, the situation in Cyprus flared up when Turkish soldiers killed a 
Greek Cypriot National Guardsman as, unarmed, he entered the UN 
buffer zone. This incident was followed by another more serious incident 
in August when scuffles broke out in the buffer zone between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots, leaving two unarmed Greek Cypriots dead, one of them 
shot by a Turkish soldier as he climbed up a flag pole to remove the 
Turkish flag. In a resolution approved by the European Parliament in 
September 1996, these acts were condemned. The EU was called upon to 
stop financial aid to Turkey while the latter was asked to clarify its 
position on four issues: human rights, democratisation, the Cyprus 
question and the Kurdish problem77• The year ended on a very optimistic 
note, further diplomatic efforts having led to Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
agreeing to begin direct negotiations in the first half of 1997. However, 
1997 commenced with tension heating up again between Cyprus, Greece 
and Turkey over plans by Cyprus to purchase the S-300 long-range anti-
aircraft missile system from Russia. Turkish Foreign Minister Tansu 
CHler said that her country was ready to "strike" should the Russian 
missiles be deployed in Cyprus7S, The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
issued a statement on January 1st, 1997, reminding the Russian 
74 These words were used to sum up the meeting of the Cypriot National Council 
headed by Clerides and Greek Prime Minister, Papandreou, held in Athens on 
May 4th, 1995, Cyprus Bulletin, Vol. XXXIII, no. 10, May 15th, 1995. 
75 Cyprus Bulletin, Vol. XXXIII, no. 13, June 26th, 1995. 
76 Reported in the Cyprus Bulletin, Vol. XXXIV, no. 10, May 13th, 1996. 
77 EP Resolution on the Political Situation in Turkey, September 19th, 1996, OJ C 
320 of 28th October, 1996, pp. 187-189. 
78 Europe News Bulletin, Agence Europe, no. 6891, 14th January 1997. 
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Federation of its obligations under the OSCE and as a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council. Turkey also referred to a Greek 
. attempt to "encircle Turkey from the South"79. On December 23rd, 1996, 
the Security Council of the UN had approved a resolution in which it 
reiterated its grave concern about the excessive levels of military forces 
and armaments in Cyprus, the rate at which they were being upgraded and 
the lack of progress towards a significant reduction in the number of 
foreign troops on the island80• 
The USA used all diplomatic means at its disposal in the attempt to 
end the crisis. Following a meeting with Cypriot President Glafcos 
Clerides in Nicosia on Sunday 12th January 1997, US mediator Carey 
Cavanaugh said that the former had assured him that none of the surface-
to-air missiles Cyprus had ordered from Russia would be delivered for at 
least 16 months. "/ believe this should diffuse the crisis," he said, adding 
that he had not asked Cyprus to cancel the order. 
The Greek instigated arms race on the island is probably intended to 
diminish the value of Turkey's military option and force it to the 
negotiating table. The likelihood of a successful Greek -Cypriot incursion 
in the North is doubtful, since Turkish military strength is superior by far. 
The hypothetical question is, what would happen at some future date if, 
as members of the EU, Cyprus and Greece should feel confident enough 
to attempt to resolve the issue by resorting to war? 
The problem is aggravated by the fact that no tangible progress 
appears to being made in the inter communal talks. During 1997, direct 
inter communal talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were held 
in New York between the 8th and 13th of July, 1997 and later in Geneva 
in August under UN auspices81• These were unsuccessful and the Greek 
Cypriot side blamed Turkish intransigence82• Turkey and'tthe TRNCI 
citing the "negative effects of Agenda 2000 of the European Commission'\ 
79 Statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Tansu 
Ciller, January 10th, 1997, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Internet Web site). 
80 Security Council Resolution, no. 10932, December 23rd, 1996. 
81 The European Council issued a statement on these talks on July 8th, 1997. It 
called on the Cypriot parties "to enter into these talks with a spirit of openness. It 
hopes that the talks will enable the parties to engage in a genuine negotiating 
process ... The Union will do everything in its power ... to achieve a positive 
outcome ... with an eye in particular to the prospective opening of the process of 
its enlargement." 
82 Cyprus Bulletin, Vol. XXXV, no. 16, 20th August, 1997. 
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signed an Association Agreement providing for the partial economic 
integration of Northern Cyprus with Turkey. Cyprus naturally launched 
a protest in the UN against this move on August 12th while Greece did 
the same in the European Councils3• Meanwhile, more inter communal 
talks have been promised for the future. The Greek Cypriots claim that 
since the July 1'997 publication of Agenda 2000 by the European 
Commission and the reiteration by the Union that accession negotiations 
with Cyprus will commence on schedule, the Turkish side has become 
even more intransigent84• This intransigence can now be explained as 
being directly linked to Turkey's wider aim of gaining access to the EU. 
The situation is tense. With the prospects of the forthcoming 
accession n.egotiations, the EU has expressed the wish that ways be 
devised of involving the Turkish Cypriot side in the accession 
negotiationss5• The Greek Cypriot government has indicated that it is 
ready to propose formulas by which representatives of the Turkish 
Cypriot Community would be included in the negotiation process on the 
same footing as other non-governmental organisations. 
A solution to the Cyprus Problem depends not only on the two 
Cypriot communities but also on their respective sponsors, Greece and 
Turkey. A rapprochement between these two countries would provide a 
sounder basis for a solution. In May 1997, a committee of experts was set 
up between Greece and Turkey to examine the outstanding disputes 
between the two sides. It is not the aim of the committee for the two sides 
to engage in direct negotiations, but rather to clarify what the problems 
are. Athens does not appear to be attaching more importance to this 
Committee. In July, on the fringes of the Madrid NATO summit, Turkish 
President SUleyman Demirel and Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis 
issued a joint communique, which the Greek Prime Minister described as 
a "non-aggression" pactS6• However, since then, Turkey has taken a 
stronger uncooperative stance towards the EU while the Cypriot inter-
communal talks have been pronounced dead. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Cyprus Bulletin, Vol. XXXV, no. 17, 3rd September, 1977. 
85 Declaration by EU Council President Jacques Poos reported in Europe News 
Bulletin, no. 7049, Brussels, September 3rd, 1997, point 002. 
86 The contents of the communique were published in The Cyprus Bulletin, Vol. 
XXXV, no. 14, July 16th, 1997. 
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